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A THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE
AUCTIONEERS' LIABILITY REGIMES
S. THOMAS
G. HANSEN*

RANDALL
ROBERT

In Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co. a New York appellate court greatly

expanded the liability of investment advisors working as corporate auctioneers. Under
this new legal regime, auctioneer/advisors accused of simple negligence are exposed to
billions of dollars of potential legal liabilities. This Article first reviews the existing law
covering audioneer/advisors and shows that the Schneider decision conflicts with the
law governing general auctioneers and with the law governing the role of advisors and
directors during the sale of corporate control. Next, using an auction-theoretic
framework, this Article shows that Schneider will likely result in: (1) increased
indemnification of auctioneer/advisors by corporations; (2) reduced net proceeds to
selling company shareholders when there is a sale of the corporation; (3) increased use
of pure cash as means-of-payment in sales of corporations; and (4) fewer sales of
corporations. Schneider's net impact therefore is to place shareholders in a less
advantageous position than under prior law.
To demonstrate these economic effects, the authors employ a combination of
principal/agent theory and auction theory. This is natural, for the advisors are hired by
the directors to conduct an auction. A simple principal/agent model is the basis for the
authors' prediction of indemnification; if indemnification does indeed occur, the selling
corporation retains the Schneider liability. Rational bidders for the corporation,
knowing they will assume this liability, will lower their bids, and auction theory predicts
that the expected high bid will fall by more than the expected Schneiderliability. Thus,
the net effect on the selling shareholders is negative: the lower price more than offsets
expected proceeds from legal suits.

I. INTRODUCTION

Auctions are now a common method used for selling companies,
whether the sale is initiated by the selling company or by an unsolicited
takeover bid. To facilitate the large number of auctions being conducted,
an industry of corporate auctioneers has developed. These corporate
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in researching this article.
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auctioneers are primarily investment bankers, lawyers, and consultants
who advise sellers on how to structure an auction and who often conduct
the ensuing auction. Corporate auctioneers advise directors on all aspects
of the auction process, including selecting and screening of potential
bidders, managing the information flow to bidders, setting and policing
the rules of the auction, and advising the seller as to which, if any, bids
are acceptable.
Such an auctioneer would find a voluminous economics literature to
guide it in structuring an auction to maximize the expected selling price.1
For example, the auctioneer could find analyses of how various bidding
rules affect bidding strategy and hence prices; of how to set entry fees
and reserve prices; of how information disclosure affects gelling prices;
and of how different bidding rules affect the formation of bidder cartels.
The auctioneer would also find that some general auction analysis has
been brought to bear on both the business and public policy aspects of
corporate auctions.' Curiously though, auctioneers themselves have been
neglected in this literature.3 The courts and commentators have made no
more than passing reference to the economics of the party actually
conducting the auction. 4
This article aims to fill part of this void. We employ auction theory
to examine the impact of recent court decisions that have highlighted
corporate auctioneers' potential legal liability. Our model applies auction
theory to predict that shareholders will receive lower prices in a corporate
auction when the courts increase auctioneers' potential legal liability.
To illustrate this point, we examine two legal decisions that created
tremendous potential legal liability for corporate auctioneers. The first
1.
Paul Milgrom, Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,3 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (1989)
provides an introduction to the most recent theoretical work in auctions. R. Preston
McAfee & John Macmillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON. Lrr. 699 (1987) gives
a more in-depth review of all work to date.
2.
See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Casefor Facilitating Competing Tender
Offers, 95 HARV..L. REV. 1028 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The
ProperRole of Target Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1161 (1981); Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and Property Rights in
CorporateAssets, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85 (1990); Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz,
Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L., ECON. & ORO. 27 (1991).
3.
McAfee & Macmillan, supra note 1, at 732. In fact, cases and commentary
about any aspect of investment advisor liability are scarce. Dale A. Oesterle & Jon R.
Norberg, Management Buyouts: Creating or Appropriating Shareholder Wealth?, 41
VAND. L. REV. 207, 214 n.31 (1988).
4.
There are references to directors of the corporation as "auctioneers," but these
refer to the legal duties of directors in supervising the conduct of a sale of a company, not
to the directors serving as auctioneers themselves. See infra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for discussion on directors' "Revlon duties."
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is Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Inc.,' in which the Delaware
Supreme Court stated that an investment banker could be personally liable
for improperly conducting an auction.' After Mills Acquisition though,
the potential for finding liability under Delaware law remained relatively
remote: a plaintiff had to prove both that the corporate directors breached
their fiduciary duties and that the advisor had assisted in that breach.'
Auctioneers' potential liability dramatically increased after Schneider
v. Lazard Freres & Co., when a New York appellate court held an
investment banker could be directly liable, under agency law principles,
to the acquired companies' shareholders for negligently conducting an
auction. The Schneider case arose out of the sale of RJR Nabisco.
Briefly stated, RJR's public shareholders sued the Special Committee's
investment advisors who conducted the auction, claiming that they gave
the RJR Special Committee faulty advice concerning the value of two
competing bids. The Schneider court held that to win a suit against the
auctioneers, RJR's shareholders needed only to prove that the auctioneers
somehow acted negligently-for example, did not value a bid properly,
stopped the bidding too soon, or gave one bidder an informational
advantage. 9 Shareholders no longer need to prove that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties. If this ruling is adopted by other courts,
it would have a profound effect on auctioneer liability.
These decisions aimed to correct perceived abuses of the auction
process by investment banker auctioneers that harmed the intended
beneficiaries of the auction, the auctioned companies' shareholders. The
message that these bankers had substantial legal exposure was undoubtedly intended by the courts to benefit shareholders. Yet, in imposing legal
liability on investment bankers for the misconduct of an auction, the
courts did not focus on the impact of their decisions upon the bidding and
5.
559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1988).
6.
In Mills Acquisition, the Special Committee formed by the target's board of
directors to handle the sale of the target company worked with an investment bank advisor
whom the court described as an "auctioneer." This advisor was found to have knowingly
joined two of the target company's advisors in breaching their fiduciary duties to the
company's shareholders by, inter alia, tipping one of the two competing bidders about
certain material terms of the other bidders' bid. Id. at 1282-84.
7.
See generally Ronald A. Brown, Jr., Note, Claims of Aiding and Abetting a
Director's Breach of Fiduciary Duty-Does Everybody Who Deals with a Delaware
Director Owe Fiduciary Duties to that Director's Shareholders?, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 943
(1990).
8.
Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1990); see Donald
Lund, Comment, Toward A Standard for Third-Party Advisor Liability in Mergers and
Buy-Outs: Schneider and Beyond, 52 U. PIrr. L. REv. 603, 616 (1991).
9.
For further discussion of the Schneider decision and its impact on liability, see
infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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auction process itself, the real determinants of the price paid in a
corporate auction.
This Article conducts a legal and economic analysis of the liability
rules for corporate auctioneers, focusing particularly on the potential
effects of the Schneider decision. It argues that the courts were mistaken
in their attempt to aid shareholders by increasing auctioneers' liability,
and that the actual effect of these decisions will be to make shareholders
worse off. More specifically, its findings are as follows: First, it should
be expected that auctioneers will request, and that directors will grant,
indemnification for the auctioneers against their Schneider liability.
Second, there will be little or no change in the quality of advice given by
auctioneers in the conduct of auctions, although the auctioneers will
change their behavior in a litigation-minimizing fashion. Third, the
expected auction price received by selling shareholders for their company
will decline, and the decline will exceed the expected proceeds to
shareholders from Schneider suits. Thus, selling company shareholders
will be worse off than before. Fourth, there will be fewer transactions
effected via non-cash payment methods, and as a result there will be
fewer total transactions. Last, and overall, the economic efficiency of the
market for corporate control will decline.
From the legal point of view, we argue that the Schneider ruling
marks a significant departure from an existing regime that was consistent
with general legal rulings on non-corporate auctioneers;"0 with the
developing case law on directors' duties when a company is "for sale";"
and with the traditional corporate law principle that directors of a
corporation are not agents of the shareholders in the legal sense. 2 The
Schneider ruling holds that agency law, not corporate law, governs the
directors when the corporation is for sale. 3 Although we understand the
Schneider court's concerns-one cannot read the history of the RJR
buyout without worrying about the RJR shareholders being unprotected '4-we argue that the existing legal regime and economic incentives
sufficiently protect shareholders against inappropriate behavior by
10.
See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
11.
See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
12.
"It is well-settled law that directors are not agents of the shareholders, or even
of the corporation." Herbert M. Wachtell et al., Investment Banker Liability to
Shareholders in the Sale-of-Control Context, 60 N.Y.L.J., March 29, 1990, at 1-3. See
infra notes 59-61 (discussing directors' fiduciary duty as trustees on behalf of the
company's shareholders).
13.
Schneider therefore has important implications for directors' liability as well
as for advisors' liability. In this paper we focus primarily on the latter.
14.
See generally BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE (1990).
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directors and auctioneers. 5 The possible benefits from Schneider will
be low because indemnification agreements will leave auctioneers'
incentives unchanged. Nevertheless, the costs will be large-lower prices
for shareholders, fewer transactions, and more shareholder suits and
litigation costs.
Section II summarizes the institutional features of corporate auctions,
in particular the roles played by advisors to the selling company (i.e., the
auctioneers) and how these advisors might incur legal liability. Section
III reviews existing law concerning auctioneers, including that pertaining
to general auctioneers. This section also discusses the Schneider case and
how the ruling departs from existing law on sales of corporations and the
liability of auctioneers. Section IV begins by considering the issue of
indemnification and then applies auction theory to determine the effects
of the selling corporation acquiring potential financial liability through its
indemnification of its auctioneer. We conclude the paper with a
discussion of broader issues concerning legal liability versus economic
incentives for affecting behavior.
II. INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF CORPORATE AUCTIONS
AND THE ROLE OF THE AUCTIONEER

Auctions have been employed for thousands of years as an efficient

device for transferring ownership of assets. 6 In the natural evolutionary
search for optimal auction rules, several auction characteristics have
emerged as timelessly popular. For example, the most basic rule of an
auction concerns how the selling price is determined. Typically, auctions
fall into one of three categories for price determination: the English,
oral, or ascending-price auction; the Dutch, or descending-price auction;
and the sealed-bid (first-price auction).' 7 The English auction is by far
the most common. Price is determined through open, oral bidding, with
the last and highest bid being the selling price. In the Dutch auction, the
bidding starts high and falls steadily-in some instances, the price
reduction is accomplished with a clock-like mechanism; a hand of the
15.
This is particularly true in light of the increased power that institutional
shareholders exercise in matters of corporate governance. See generally Bernard S.
Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 811 (1992).
16.
For a thorough history on the use of auctions to transfer property rights, see
RALPH CASSADY, AUCTIONS AND AucTIoNEERINo (1967).

17.
For further discussion of the different types of price-determination methods,
see, for example, David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender
Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 192-93 (May 1986).
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clock slowly ticks off lower and lower prices. Selling price in such an
auction is determined when a bidder stops the clock; the first bidder to
stop the clock wins the auction and pays the price at which he signalled
a willingness to purchase. In a sealed-bid auction, bidders submit sealed
bids to the seller; the bidder submitting the highest bid wins the auction.
Typically with sealed-bids, the winning bidder pays the amount of his bid
(a first-price sealed-bid auction), but there is a less-common version
wherein the high bidder pays the amount of the second-highest bid (a
second-price sealed-bid auction). 18
While the price-determination rules may be the most basic aspect of
an auction, there are other institutional characteristics that can be as
important, or more so, in affecting the final price: selection of bidders;
information disclosure; means-of-payment; and setting reserve prices, to
name some of the more important ones.19 These institutional characteristics vary much more widely than the basic price-determination rules.
Understanding all the details of the specific auction methods used for any
class of asset is therefore critical. For auctions of companies, this
requires two separate analyses: one for auctions of private companies or
divisions of public companies, and one for auctions of entire public
companies.
A. Auctions of Private Companies or of Divisions of Public Companies
In the sale of a private company, or in the divestiture of a public
company's division or subsidiary, the seller has considerable freedom to
structure the auction as it pleases. This contrasts strongly with the
auction of a public company, where processes are dictated to a great
extent by the ability of bidders to circumvent the selling company's board
of directors and/or management by making offers directly to the
shareholders. With a private company, or the sale of a division of a
public company, corporate law places the board and management in a
position to determine who will be permitted to see confidential information; whose bids will be considered; what form bids must take; and which
bid will be accepted.' In practice, companies use a fairly homogeneous
set of practices for these auctions.
18.
This method is also known as the Vickrey auction. McAfee & Macmillan,
supra note 1, at 703.
19.
See sources cited supra note 1 for further discussion of these auction
characteristics.
20.
Under Delaware law, heightened judicial scrutiny of directors' conduct of an
auction is not triggered unless the partial sale constitutes a "clear break-up" of the
company. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del.
1990).
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Investment advisors are usually employed to aid the seller in
conducting the auction. Employing specialist auctioneers in this capacity
has several advantages. First, these advisors are experienced in conducting auctions; they conduct auctions frequently and, based on their
extensive experience, are well situated to advise sellers on how to
proceed. Second, even in the sale of private companies, there is the
potential for conflict of interest between the owners and management;
bringing in outside advisors to assist in selecting bidders and in determining the winner alleviates these problems. Third, it is important in
auctions for sellers to be able to bind themselves to the rules of play: For
example, an opportunistic seller would want to re-open negotiations after
seeing the sealed-bids of a supposedly first and final round of bidding.21
Buyers would have legitimate reason to be wary of such opportunism, for
there is almost by definition a "last-period" aspect to any corporate
auction. Thus, advisors-who have reputational capital at stake and will
therefore object to opportunism-can serve the purpose of giving
assurance to buyers that they will follow the auction rules. This allows
the seller to commit to optimal auction rules. Finally, advisors are
typically investment banks or consulting firms that know the players in
the market, that is, who are the willing and able buyers. They also have
good information about what should be the expected selling price. This
information is essential to the seller in selecting bidders, setting a reserve
price, and valuing any non-cash bids. Although such information could
potentially be purchased outright, it is probably economic to have the
provider of the information also be the one who puts the information to
use.2

The process of selecting an advisor can vary from company to
company. Often the selling company will have a banking or consulting
relationship with a professional services firm and the choice will be a
natural one. Other times the company will engage in extensive shopping.
There seems, however, to be relatively little price competition among
auctioneers; instead, the competition is over the quality of service
21.
See McAfee & Macmillan, supra note 1, at 703.
22.
The main reason for this is that information collection and decision-making,
to be efficient, must proceed simultaneously. If a selling company tries to purchase the
relevant information outright, it will not know beforehand exactly what information and
how much information is required. Also, it will often be more efficient for the agent who
collects the information to then make certain decisions internally, for the qualitative/complex nature of the information would make it costly to completely transfer the
information to a separate decision-maker.
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provided. In fact, pricing of auction services is rather standardized. 3
Although flat fees may also be employed either by themselves or in
conjunction with contingency fees, the bulk of advisors' fees is typically
tied to the value of the completed deal.'
Once the company selects its advisor, a typical private auction
process proceeds as follows.
Using knowledge about the selling
company and its business, the advisor chooses a number of potential
purchasers and sends them a very preliminary prospectus describing the
business to be sold. Often at this point the company's name will not even
be mentioned. Once a prospective purchaser signs a confidentiality
agreement, a more thorough prospectus will be sent along. This
prospectus will contain the minimum amount of information necessary for
a prospective bidder to make a financial evaluation of the company to be
sold. Indeed, at this stage the advisor commonly asks for preliminary
indications of interest from the prospective purchasers. The seller uses
these preliminary indications to further narrow the field of bidders for
entry into the next round, where more proprietary information will be
disclosed.'
Preparation of a "data room" as well as management
presentations and plant visits characterize this next step in the auction
process. The data room will house detailed financial statements,
marketing information, and copies. of the company's various contracts
(utility contracts, union contracts, etc.). Throughout this entire process
prospective bidders will often call on the advisors (who have instructed
the selling company's management to direct all such calls to them) and
ask for further disclosure of certain information.
Bidders may attempt at various stages of the process to make a preemptive bid. These bids will usually come before the data room stage,
for they are motivated at least in part by a desire on the part of a
prospective purchaser to limit the disclosure to other parties of strategical23.
A commonly-used pricing mechanism is the so-called Lehman formula: 5%
of the first million dollars of sales price, 4% of the second million, 3% of the third, 2%
of the fourth, and 1% of the remaining.
24.
See MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, 2 TAKEOVERS AND
FREEZEOUTS C-15-17 Appendix C(2a) (1990) for an example of a typical fee agreement.

25.
For further discussion and analysis of the auction process, see Robert G.
Hansen, Auctions of Corporations(1991) (on file with author), and Two Sides to Every
Auction, MERGERS AND AcQUISITIONS (Nov./Dec. 1989).

26.
One of the more interesting questions concerning this auction process is how
the seller can use the initial bids to screen for the highest-valued bidders. It would seem
that bidders would simply bid high to ensure their participation in the next round.
Hansen, supra note 25, argues that a separating equilibrium can be maintained if sellers
use the first-round bids to set a reserve price for the second auction; bidding high in the
first round therefore imposes a cost (higher reserve price) on the bidder.
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ly sensitive information.
In this case, the auction process may be
aborted should the seller believe that the proffered bid is sufficiently high
to merit immediate acceptance.
If no such pre-emptive bid is received, and the process moves
smoothly along the path outlined above, the auction usually culminates in
a final round of sealed bidding. The price determination rule is most
often first-price sealed bid, but there can be pressure from losing bidders
to re-open the bidding. If the advisor gives in to this pressure, its
reputation with buyers will be adversely affected. If the advisor is known
for reneging on the rules in this way, bidders would lower their initial
bids because they would expect an opportunity to raise their bid if the
first one is too low to win.28 Advisors therefore have an incentive to
persuade the corporation's directors that following the auction rules will
lead to maximum revenues.
Choosing the winning bidder may also present certain difficulties,
because the advisor/selling company may have allowed or even invited
non-cash bids (debt, stock, or more complicated earn-out arrangements
based upon earnings of the selling company in future years)."
A
comparison of the bids and a determination of the highest bid might
require an evaluation of securities that depends upon the value of the
purchaser's securities, or upon the combined value of the selling company
and the purchaser. This creates uncertainty in deciding which bid is the
highest bid, an uncertainty that the law reflects. Delaware law, for
example, does not require the directors to accept the nominally highest
bid received in the auction if there are significant contingencies attached
to it, such as difficulties in valuing new securities.'
There are numerous steps in this auction process where an auctioneer/advisor must make strategic, risky choices, which even though
reasonable ex ante, could turn out to be unfortunate ex post. In preparing
the prospectus, the auctioneer might leave out what appears to be
irrelevant information, that later turns out to be important; such an error
could lead to a lawsuit by either the selling company's shareholders or by

27.
Hansen, supra note 25, argues that it is the presence of information which,
if it is broadcast, would reduce the value of the selling company that drives many of the
institutional features of corporate auctions.
28.
McAfee & Macmillan, supra note 1 at 703.
29.
On the value of non-cash bids, see Robert G. Hansen, A Theory for the
Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions, 60 J. Bus. 75 (1987) and infra
notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
30.
See Caruana v. Saligman, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 95,889, 99,370-80 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990).
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a disappointed bidder." Or, the auctioneer might disclose information
unequally across bidders. The auctioneer could through negligence, or
by choice, leave out of the final round a bidder who might be the highvalued purchaser. Most importantly, the auctioneer might incorrectly
value a non-cash bid and therefore accept something other than the highest
bid. Any of these errors could result in a negligence suit against the
auctioneer, where the auctioneer will be hard pressed to defend against
fact-finders who, despite the laws' admonishments, judge the past with

perfect hindsight.
B. Auctions of Public Companies

Although an auction of a publicly traded company can be done in
much the same way as an auction of a private company, auctions of
public companies often differ in two aspects from those of private
companies: first, the auction may be initiated by a hostile bid; and
second, the directors of the selling company face more stringent legal
duties.32 These differences influence the timing of the auction process,
the auction rules that can be employed, and the role of the auctioneer
advisors. Of course, the auction of a public company also admits the
possibility of defensive actions by the selling company meant to prevent
its sale.33
31.
See Herskowitz v. Nutri-System, Inc., 857 F.2d 179, 190 (3d Cir. 1988)
(investment banker advisor to Special Committee liable to shareholders under Section
14(a) of the 1934 Exchange Act for materially false and misleading statements in proxy
materials), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1054, 1060 (1989); see also Folger Adam Co. v. PMI
Industries, Inc., 938 F.2d 1529 (2d Cir. 1991) (in sale of corporate subsidiaries for stock,
investment bankers whose names appeared on selling memorandum have potential
securities law liability for misstatements therein).
32.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. 1986). One additional and important difference between the sale of closely-held
private companies and the sale of public companies is that large groups of public
shareholders are generally less capable of acting collectively to block sales of assets. The
public shareholders' collective action problems may underlie the courts' decisions in Mills
Acquisition and Schneider.
33.
Much of the literature on corporate auctions deals with the problem of
discriminating between actions taken by management to increase the sale price versus
actions taken by management to protect their own interests. Some of the more recent
articles applying auction theory to this problem include Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz,
Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 27 (1991);
Jonathan R. Macey, Auction Theory, MBOs and PropertyRights in CorporateAssets, 25
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 85 (1990); lan Ayres, Analyzing Stock Lock-ups: Do Target
Treasury Sales Foreclose or Facilitate Takeover Auctions?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 682
(1990); Alan Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 229 (1986); Alan Schwartz, Defensive Tactics and Optimal Search, 5 J.L. ECON.
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The selling company may find it difficult to control the timing of the
auction process. Hostile bidders put "fuses" on their tender offers,
attempting to force shareholders to tender their shares as early as
possible, with the result that they eliminate management and the board of
directors from the process entirely. These pressures on the selling
company have been greatly reduced by third generation state anti-takeover
statutes and the renewed vitality of poison pills after the 7ime decision.
Yet, even if the sale of the company was initiated by the selling
company's board or management, any ensuing auction can be disturbed
by a-pre-emptive tender offer directed to the shareholders. By comparison, in the sale of a private company pre-emptive bids are made but there
is no direct route to the owner/shareholders as there is in the form of a
tender offer for a publicly traded company.
A public company may also find it difficult to stick with its preferred
auction rules. For example, the auctioneer may not be able to use any
form of sealed bids, for if the selling company were to turn down a
revised higher offer by a losing bidder, it could face a lawsuit by a
shareholder, claiming that the company's board did not maximize value
for its shareholders. Thus, auctions of public companies may turn into
English ascending price auctions.' Indeed, the legal duties of directors
of public corporations generally make it all the more important for them
to employ auction methods that are in the shareholders' best interests-or
which are at least more defensible from a legal standpoint. This situation
makes the role of advisors all the more critical.
Besides helping to maximize the proceeds for the selling shareholders, the advisors should try to ensure that auction rules are structured so
as to minimize the directors' legal exposure in shareholder suits. Even
before Schneider, lawsuits after the auction of a public corporation were
almost inevitable. The Schneider decision exacerbates this problem by
expanding the scope of potential liability for the auctioneer and other third
& ORG. 413 (1989). For a more general discussion of these issues, see John C. Coffee,
Jr., ShareholdersVersus Managers: The Strain in the CorporateWeb, 85 MICH. L. REV.
1 (1986); Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender
Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982); Lucian Bebchuk, The Case For Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
34.
Leebron, supra note 17, at 194. However, in a sealed bid auction, the seller
can seek to penalize bidders that break the rules by awarding the winner a break-up fee
or an asset lock-up. This procedure gives bidders a strong incentive to make their best
bid in the auction and not in a subsequent tender offer.
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party professionals involved in the auction process. 35
Of course, as auctioneers get more involved not only in the auction
process but also in the company's takeover defense, then the auctioneers'
potential legal liability-even before Schneider-expands.' Schneider,
however, makes the auctioneer's role in the auction of a public company
considerably more 37prone to litigation by expanding the avenues for
auctioneer liability.
III.

AUCTIONEER LIABILITY, BEFORE AND AFTER SCHNEIDER

A. Non-CorporateAuctioneer Liability
The current state of the law regarding auctioneers outside the
corporate auction sphere is quite clear: auctioneers are viewed as the
agents of the seller and therefore have minimal duties to third parties.38
This principle is an extension of the rule that "an agent is not responsible
to third persons where his principal is disclosed." 39 The general
limitation on the duties of an auctioneer to a buyer changes if both the
35.
Comment, Third-Party Advisors, supra note 8, at 616. For instance,
shareholders can allege that the special committee's legal advisors gave poor legal advice
or that its accountants negligently prepared financial statements. The potential for an
outpouring of suits against advisors to the special committee is very real. In analogous
circumstances, an outburst of lawsuits have been filed against lawyers and accountants
acting as advisors to defunct savings and loan associations. See Sherry R. Sontag, Soured
Deals Snag More Professionals, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 4, 1991, at 31.
36.
We recognize that investment bankers often play a role as the target
company's chief takeover defensive strategists. In this capacity, the investment banker
will try and stop any sale of the company. We have limited our analysis to those
situations where, as in Revlon, the sale of the company is inevitable. See infra note 47.
37.
See Section III.C, infra, for further discussion of this point.
38.
Auctioneers' liability to their principal, the seller, for the misconduct of an
auction is a well established legal principle. Courts have traditionally held that an
auctioneer is the seller's agent. See, e.g., Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d
112, 113 (2d Cir. 1968).
39.
Castille v. Folck, 338 So. 2d 328,333 (La. Ct. App. 1976). The general rule
is that the auctioneer is the agent of the buyer only after "the hammer falls" and only for
the limited purpose of presenting written evidence at the time of sale. See, e.g., In re
Premier Container Corp., 408 N.Y.S.2d 725, 729-30 (Sup. Ct. 1978), modified on other
grounds, 427 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1980); see also Paul Reynolds, Note, Chernick v. FasigTipton: a Caveat to the Horse Trader, 74 KY. L.J. 889, 909-10 n.140 (1985-86). Upon
acceptance of the bid, the auctioneer becomes the agent of both the principal and the
purchaser for the purpose of executing the memorandum that takes the transaction out of
operation of the statute of frauds. Peters v. Day, 210 N.Y.S. 42, 44 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
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seller and bidders pay a commission to the auctioneer.' Of course, as
agents of the seller/principal, auctioneers must follow their principal's
instructions, seek the highest price (unless the principal wants otherwise)
and generally act consistently with their fiduciary duties toward their

principal.
principal.

To do otherwise would open the way for a suit by the

Noncorporate auctioneers' liability to their seller is governed by

familiar agency law principles. As the seller's agent, the auctioneer has
a fiduciary duty to the seller to conduct the auction so as to get the
highest price possible for the goods."' If the auctioneer conducts "the
auction in a negligent manner, the principal has a cause of action against
the auctioneer.42
There are, of course, very significant differences between the
practices of well-known artand antique auctioneers, such as Sotheby's,
and corporate auctioneers. Sotheby's standard contract with its clients
provides that it retains "absolute discretion" over the conduct of the
auction. It solicits and receives bids, then is the final authority as to
which bid is accepted.
Corporate auctioneers' agency is much more restricted in scope. For
example, investment bankers never wield a gavel. Their primary
40.
When an auctioneer is an agent for both the buyer and the seller, this dual
agency imposes specific duties on that auctioneer. See Note, Chernick v. Fasig-Tipton,
supra note 39, at 908 n.132.
Also, the Restatement (Second) of Agency states:
An agent who, to the knowledge of two principals, acts for both of them in
a transaction between them, has a duty to act with fairness to each and to
disclose to each all facts which he knows or should know would reasonably
affect the judgment of each in permitting such dual agency, except as to a
principal who has manifested that he knows such facts or does not care to
know them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENcY § 392 (1958).
41.
See Elco Shoe Mfr. v. Sisk, 183 N.E. 191, 192 (N.Y. 1932); Cristallina S.A.
v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 172 (1986). Furthermore, as the
principal's agent, the auctioneer cannot purchase the property which it is employed to sell.
Moore v. Moore, 5 N.Y. 256, 261 (1851).
42.
See, e.g., Cristallina, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 171 (auctioneer has a fiduciary duty
to act in the utmost good faith and in the interests of its principal; if auctioneer breaches
that duty, it is liable for damages caused to the principal through breach of contract or
negligence).
This liability cuts both ways because an auctioneer can also sue the principal for
taking actions inconsistent with the agency relationship. See Hemphill-Kunstler-Buhler
v. Davis Wholesale Elec. Supply Co., 516 So.2d 402, 404 (La. App. 1987) (finding a
sole shareholder liable to an auctioneer where the shareholder had disrupted the auction
that the corporation had hired the auctioneer to conduct), writ denied, 520 So.2d 751
(1988).
43.
Sotheby's Master Consignment Agreement (copy on file with the authors).
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responsibility is to solicit bids and transmit them to the board of directors.
The board retains all authority to accept a bid.
The Sotheby's agreement provides that the seller waives its right to
sue the auctioneer for any claim arising out of the conduct of the
auction." In the corporate context, as we discuss in the next sections,
the board of directors typically retains (though rarely exercises) the right
to sue its investment bankers for improperly conducting an auction.
B. CorporateAuctioneers' Liability Pre-Schneider

There is a rapidly expanding body of Delaware case law that treats
directors of a public corporation that is "for sale" as "auctioneers" and
imposes certain duties upon them. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings,' the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the idea of an
auction as a sufficient, but not necessary, method for selling a company.' The court held that when a corporation is for sale "[t]he directors'
role changes from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the
44.
Id.
45.
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, Ronald Perlman's company, Pantry
Pride, made a hostile bid for Revlon, Inc. Revlon's board initially adopted several
defensive measures and claimed that the company was not for sale. When these measures
did not succeed in driving Perlman away, the company switched gears and planned its
own sale of the company to a friendly bidder, Forstmann Little & Co., in a deal that
would include management. The bidding between Perlman and Forstmann Little went
back and forth, until the Revlon board granted Forstmann Little an asset lock-up and
agreed to a no-shop provision in a deal at a price only nominally greater than that offered
by Perlman. Upon learning of the deal, Perlman topped the last Forstmann Little bid and
filed suit. Id. at 176-79.
The Delaware Supreme Court found that the Revlon board of directors acted
improperly by considering the threat of a bondholder suit against the directors if they did
not accept the Forstmann Little bid. The Court noted that the Revlon board ignored its
duties to get the best price for shareholders by preferring the bondholders. Id. at 182.
It went on to enjoin the lock-up and no-shop provisions. Id. at 185. Perlman's tender
offer for the company closed shortly thereafter.
46.
Revlon's genesis from trusts and agency common law was described in
Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time, Inc., 15 DEL. J.C.L. 700, revised, 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. Ch. 1989): "Revlon was not a radical departure from existing Delaware, or
other, law (i.e., it has always been the case that when a trustee or other fiduciary sells an
asset . . . [the trustee's] duty is to seek the single goal of getting the best available
price)." Ronald J. Rinaldi, Note, Radically Altered States: Entering the "Revlon Zone,"
90 COLUM. L. REV. 760, 770 (1990).
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"'

Our focus, however, is not on the role of the directors in overseeing
a sale, but on the role of the advisors who actually conduct the auction.
Prior to Schneider, the legal liability of these auctioneers was clearly
defined, as revealed in Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc." The
Macmillan auction was a one-sided bidding process that ended with the
company's board of directors shutting out a determined potential acquiror
by executing a merger agreement with a management-backed bidder. The
merger agreement contained extremely favorable auction-ending crown

jewel lockup49 and no-shop' provisions that were never offered to the

disfavored bidder even though it had the highest bid on the table at the
end of the auction.5

The court found the Macmillan directors had

breached their fiduciary duties through the misconduct of the auction
47.
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. If the board chooses to auction the company, the
mechanics by which bids are solicited are left to its discretion so long as it acts to benefit
shareholders. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1286-87 (Del.
1989) ("Directors are not required by Delaware law to conduct an auction according to
some standard formula . . . . However, the board's primary objective, and essential
purpose, must remain the enhancement of the bidding process for the benefit of the
stockholders. ").
More generally, once the board of directors of a Delaware corporation decides to
sell a company, it becomes obligated to attempt to obtain the greatest value for the
stockholders. Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1288. The board does not have to auction
the company, but may instead choose to accomplish this objective by a more appropriate
method. Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., [1990-91 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep (CCH) 95,617 (Del. Ch. Sept. 21, 1990) (quoting Barkan v. Amstead
Industries, 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) ("Revlon does not demand that every change
of control of a Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding contest.")); TW
Services, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 1989 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,334, at
92,179 (Del. Ch. March 2, 1989) ("mhe so-called Revlon duty is not necessarily a duty
to conduct an 'auction' or to keep 'a level playing field' when the firm is for sale or,
indeed, to proceed in any prescribed way; rather it is the duty to exercise judgment (in
good faith and prudently) in an effort to maximize immediate share value.") (footnotes
omitted); Herd v. Major Realty Corp., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep
(CCH) 95,772 (Del. Ch. Dec. 21, 1990) ("While directors undoubtedly have duties in
the [Revlon] context . . . .they have no duty to employ a specific device such as the
auction or market check mechanism."). See also 1 ERNEST L. FOLK ET AL., FOLK ON
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 141.2.5.4, at 80-81 (1990 Supp.).
48.
Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d 1261.
49.
A crown jewel lockup purports to sell, or place under option, a company's
most valuable assets, or lines of business, to a third party at a bargain price to defeat an
unwanted takeover. Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1286 n.37.
50.
A no-shop provision commits the selling corporation to negotiate only with
one bidder and, in some cases, binds the selling corporation's board of directors to refuse
to provide any information to other bidders. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
51.
Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1283-84 n.33.
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because they failed to supervise the auction properly.52
But the Mills Acquisition court went further, scrutinizing investment
advisors' potential legal exposure as auctioneers.53 One of Macmillan's
investment bankers "was a principal, if not the primary, 'auctioneer' of
the company."' Finding that the banker had violated "every principle
of fair dealing" by "tipping" the management-backed bidder about how
to tailor its bid to top its opponent's bid, the court, in dicta, stated that
the investment banker could face personal liability for aiding and abetting
the Macmillan directors' breach of their fiduciary duties.55
52.
Id. at 1284 n.32. No damages were assessed against the directors, however,
because the company was (eventually) sold to the highest bidder.
53.
In this paper, we do not address shareholders' claims for negligent
misrepresentations, that is, claims based on auctioneers' potential liability to third parties
for allegedly negligent statements made by the auctioneer and relied on by these third
persons for purposes of entering into a transaction with the agent's principal. The
development of this legal doctrine for investment bankers is traced in Comment, Third
Party Advisors, supra note 8. For an excellent discussion of the negligent misrepresentation theory of liability for professionals, see John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting and
the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988); and Victor P.
Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-PartyLiability Necessary, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 295 (1988). This theory has been applied to allow a selling company's shareholders to bring suit against investment bankers advising a Special Committee when the
bankers' advice has been disseminated to the shareholders to encourage them to tender
their stock into an offer. See, Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 514
N.Y.S.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 530 N.Y.S.2d 517 (N.Y.
1988); Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., No. 06905, slip op. at 17-18 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 16, 1989) ; Dowling v. Narragansett Capital Corp., 735 F. Supp. 1105, 1125
(D.R.I. 1990); but see Brug v. Enstar Group, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Del. 1991)
(shareholders lack standing to bring suit against financial advisors for alleged negligent
misrepresentations contained in public documents).
54.
Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1281. In fairness to the investment bankers,
it should be noted that they were not a party to the litigation. No trial on the merits was
ever conducted on these issues. The court's findings about the investment bankers'
potential liability must therefore be considered dictum.
55.
Id. at 1283-84, n.33. The aiding and abetting standard of liability has been
criticized by some commentators as adversely affecting defendants that are merely
engaged in customary business activities. Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under
Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 101 (1981) (concluding
that aiding and abetting liability is inconsistent with the express language of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act). In most cases, the defendants are lawyers, accountants or
investment bankers engaged by the company, whom it is all too easy for the clever
plaintiff's lawyer to claim, knew, or should have known, of the allegedly fraudulent
conduct of the primary defendants simply because they were also working on the
transaction attacked by the plaintiff. These claims, rarely proved at trial, still retain
settlement value because defendants must still pay their attorneys, have their employees'
time spent in depositions and trials and have their offices disrupted for document
productions. Id. at 102. Other commentators respond that these suits are necessary so
that "boards and bankers know that they will be accountable for what they have done or
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The aiding and abetting standard of liability requires that the plaintiff

establish that a fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiff and the
directors, that the directors breached that fiduciary duty, and that the
corporate auctioneer knowingly participated in that fiduciary's breach.'
Establishing all this is difficult for a plaintiff,57 but Mills Acquisition
vividly illustrates the potential for spectacular success.5"
This aiding and abetting standard of auctioneer liability derives from
the traditional corporate law principle that the board of directors of a
corporation is an independent institution charged with managing the
corporation's business." A director's duty to the company's shareholders is a fiduciary duty under quasi-trust principles.' Directors are also
not done ....
"
Arthur H. Rosenbloom, Investment Banker Liability: A Panel
Discussion, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 557 (1991).
The courts have balanced these concerns in an evolving rule concerning the proper
standard for pleading an aiding and abetting claim. The judicial trend seems to be toward
requiring the plaintiff to allege something more than ordinary business activity for aiding
and abetting claims under the securities laws. See, e.g., Moore v. Kayport Package
Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1989).
56.
Knowing participation by an investment banker in directors' breach of
fiduciary duty requires knowledge of the directors' breach and intentional complicity in
it. Associated Imports, Inc. v. ASG Indus., Inc., Civ. A. No. 5953, 1984 WL 19833 at
12 (Del. Ch. 1984) (dismissing claim of aiding and abetting liability for failure to show
knowing participation). See Note, Claims of Aiding and Abetting, supra note 7, at 953
(arguing that an alleged participant cannot claim lack of knowledge if it could have been
aware of a breach of fiduciary duty by "opening its eyes" and that a court will infer
participation in the breach if the defendant had knowledge of the breach and failed to
withdraw from the transaction).
57.
These claims are frequently dismissed for failure to show that the alleged
aider and abettor knowingly participated in the directors' alleged breach of their fiduciary
duties. Associated Imports, 1984 WL 19833 at *12; see also Weinberger v. Rio Grande
Indus., 519 A.2d 116, 131 (Del. Ch. 1986) (claim for aiding and abetting a breach of
fiduciary duty against the acquiring company is dismissed for failure to establish that the
acquiring company knowingly participated in a breach of fiduciary duty); In re Sea-Land
Shareholders Litigation, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 387 (1988) (same). See generally
Note, Claims of Aiding and Abetting, supra note 7, at 944 ("the Delaware courts have
often looked at these [aiding and abetting] claims with a skeptical eye, and rightly so,
because a broad construction of this type of claim might impair a director's ability to deal
with third parties.").
58.
See Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1284 n.33. Compare Anderson v. Boothe,
103 F.R.D. 430, 441 (D. Minn. 1984) (investment bankers could not be liable as a matter
of law for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by directors to the shareholders).
59.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1974) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of
a board of directors ....

").

60.
See Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1280: Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 504, 510 (Del.
1939); Lofland v. Cahill, 118 A. 1, 3 (Del. 1922). See also Comment, Third-Party
Liability, supra note 8, at 618.
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agents of the corporation with power to act on its behalf to fix the rights
and obligations of the corporation in its dealing with third parties.61
This distinction between a director as fiduciary and a director as an agent
was aptly summarized by one commentator, "[Als to third persons,
directors are agents of the corporation, but as to the corporation itself,
equity holds them liable as trustees."'62
The directors' duties in managing the corporation's affairs include,
if they choose to auction their company, conducting the auction.'
Responsibility for the proper conduct of an auction cannot be removed
from the board, although the actual conduct of the auction can be
delegated to an agent, such as an experienced auctioneer. Agents of the
board, or of its special committees, are agents of a fiduciary and these
agents are liable to cestui qui trust, the shareholders, only if the
fiduciaries' liability is first established and the agents have acted to
participate knowingly in the breach of fiduciary duties."
C. Schneider and the Simple Negligence Standard
The Schneider decision and its new standard of auctioneer liability
grew out of the well-publicized auction of the RJR Nabisco Company.
In the initial round of shareholder litigation concerning the transaction, a
Delaware court found that a special committee of the RJR board of
directors had probably not violated Delaware law in carrying out its
auction of the company. The Special Committee had retained its own
investment bankers and attorneys to advise it on the value of the
corporation and on the proper procedures for the conduct of the auction.
The investment bankers (and lawyers) were charged with handling the
sensitive, but not legally novel, job of getting the two bidders to raise
61.
4 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1089, at
264-65 (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed. 1941).
62.
3 WILLIAM M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 841, at 209 (perm. ed. rev. 1986). Professor Coffee has described the
relationship between directors and shareholders as "sui generis" involving "a level of
discretionary authority that most agents do not possess." John C. Coffee, Jr., New York's
New Doctrine of "Constructive Privity," N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1990, at 6.
63.
Mills Acquisition, 559 A.2d at 1280.
64.
GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES § 901 (rev. 2d ed. 1982 & Supp. 1991); 4 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F.

FRATCHER, SCOTT THE LAW ON TRUSTS § 326.5 (4th ed. 1989). General principles of
tort law lead to the same result. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (b) (1939)
("For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he ... (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and
gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself ....").
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their bids without discriminating between them.'
In Schneider a New York court broke new-legal ground by permitting a direct shareholder action against the Special Committee's investment bankers.' In finding that investment bankers owed a legal duty to
RJR's shareholders under agency law principles, the court disregarded the
lack of privity in these parties' relationship. 7 The court decided that
RJR's shareholders could state a cause of action against the investment
bankers for negligently conducting the RJR auction. The specific
negligence claim stated that the investment banker advised the Special
Committee that the final bids submitted by the two bidders-KKR and the

Management Group-were "substantially equivalent from a financial point
of view" when, in fact, the latter was superior. The alleged valuation

mistake, if correct, would have cost the RJR shareholders more than $1
billion."
No one contested the fact that the investment bankers were agents of
the RJR Special Committee.' Traditional principles of corporate law
hold that auctioneers, like corporate officers, are hired by the board to
perform a specific function and are directly responsible to the board for
performing that job.' Should the auctioneer fail to perform its duties
properly, the directors would have a cause of action against them under
65.
In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1988-89 Transfer Binder]
Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
94,194, at 91,703 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989). This suit
subsequently settled. George Anders, RJR Settles Lawsuit Filed by Bondholders, WALL
S.J., Jan. 25, 1991, section C, page 13.
66.
Schneider v. Lazard Freres & Co., 552 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1990).
67.
In the appeal, the parties focused on whether there was privity of contract,
or its functional equivalent, between the investment bankers and the shareholders, with
each side trying to take advantage of an earlier decision by this same appellate division
court in which it had found two investment bankers retained by a Special Committee to
be in privity with a target company's shareholders and therefore potentially liable for
negligently valuing a target company's assets. Wells v. Shearson Lehman/American
Express, Inc., 514 N.Y.S.2d 1, 2 (App. Div. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 526 N.E.2d
428 (N.Y. 1988). See Coffee, supra note 62, at 5 for further discussion of the Wells case
and how it differs from Schneider.
68.
Schneider, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 571-72.
69.
An agency is "the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of
consent by one person [principal] to another [agent] that the other shall act on his behalf
and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF AGENCY § 1 (1958).
70.
Where an investment bank is selected by the board of directors to act as an
auctioneer because of its expertise in the area, the board is entitled to rely upon the
auctioneer's judgment and integrity in conductingthe auction. See Cristallana v. Christie,
Manson & Woods Int'l., 502 N.Y.S.2d 165, 171 (App. Div. 1986). While the auctioneer
is not a guarantor of the results of the auction, it is required to act with ordinary care and
skill and to carry out its duties in a manner consistent with its skill and expertise. Id.
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agency law. 7 Under Delaware law, the agency relationship would stop
there.' Directors of the target company are not agents of their shareholders; thus investment bankers are not in an agency relationship with
the shareholders. 3
The Schneider court deviated from traditional corporate law by
deciding that agency law governed the relationship between a target

company's shareholders and a Special Committee of its independent
directors. Directors of a corporation doing business in New York74 are
no longer corporate fiduciaries once the corporation is for sale; they

become agents of the shareholders.

In particular, the Schneider court

held that, "we are of the view that the relationship between the shareholders and the special committee was essentially that of principal and agent
on which principles of corporate law should not be superimposed. .. ."
Apparently, the court reasoned that the RJR Special Committee was set
up "specifically to protect [the interests of RJR shareholders] in the
auction," and was therefore the shareholders' agent. If the RJR Special

Committee was an agent of the shareholders, then its agents, the
71.
See, Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 597-98, and Ted J. Fiflis, Responsibility
of Investment Bankers to Shareholders,70 WASH. U. L.Q. 497 (1992), for a description
of various claims that directors can bring against auctioneers. See also J. Patrick
McDavitt & Patrick Garry, The Emerging Legal Relationship Between An Investment
Banker And Its Client: An Argument ForA FiduciaryRelationship, 12 HAMLINE L. REV.
43 (1989) (arguing that investment banks have a fiduciary duty to their clients); Marc I.
Steinberg & Evalyn N. Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U.
L.Q. 351 (1984).
72.
The Delaware courts rebuffed a recent attempt to replace the "aiding and
abetting" standard of auctioneer liability with the Schneider standard. In re Shoetown,
Inc. Stockholders Litigation ("Shoetown"), Civ. A. No. 9483, 1990 WL 13475 at "7 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 12, 1990); see also Fulco v. Continental Cablevision, Inc., [1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,345 (D. Mass. June 19, 1990) (rejecting claim that
investment banks issuing a fairness opinion owe a fiduciary duty to selling corporation's
shareholders).
73.
For further discussion of the governing agency principles, see supra Section
II.A.
74.
The Schneider court ignored the internal affairs doctrine in holding that New
York law governs the relationship between the directors of a Delaware corporation and
the corporation. Compare CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 9092 (1987) (courts should apply law of state of incorporation to a corporation's internal
affairs). See also Coffee, supra note 62, at.5, col. 1 (only Delaware law should decide
questions of the relationship between directors and shareholders of a Delaware
corporation). Where the investment bankers' advice is not communicated to shareholders
but used only by the directors to satisfy their duty of care, this is plainly a traditional
internal affair to which Schneider cannot apply. See Fiflis, supra note 54, at 27.
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investment advisors, must also be agents of the shareholders. 5 The
court rejected application of corporate law stating that the sale of
corporate control was "not corporate business of the type governed by
traditional principles of corporate governance" because "[i] n this 'buyout'
context, if something less than the highest possible price was obtained,
the loss [is] sustained by the shareholders, not the corporation ....

"76

Shareholders already have several legal options if they believe their
company was not sold for the highest price. First, they can sue the
corporation's directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Existing corporate
law requires directors to maximize the revenue shareholders receive
whenever they auction a corporation.' Not covered in such suits would
be negligent actions of the auctioneer that -occurred despite proper
supervision by directors. However, the board could-file a direct action
to enforce these claims, although such claims are rarely made. In this
situation, shareholders can bring a derivative claim. Such claims have
onerous procedural requirements.s Schneider, while duplicative of
75.
Comment, Third Party Advisor Liability, supra note 8, at 615-16, 618-19
(rejecting the Schneider court's interpretation of agency and arguing that it was wrongly
decided).
76.
Schneider, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 575. The court may also have been reacting to
a perception apparent in the Wells case that investment bankers working for special
committees are unprincipled in their analysis.
77.
See supra note 47.
78.
Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 598. Plaintiffs would have to satisfy the
procedural requirements for such a suit. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del.
1984). Derivative actions can be "procedurally burdensome" for the plaintiff shareholder.
See Comment, Third Party Advisor Liability, supra note 8, at 604 (arguing that
shareholders have "neither the time nor the funds" to bring these claims). Nevertheless,
the shareholder plaintiffs' bar brings these actions frequently. See Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and Derivative
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1991) for a critique of the existing system of derivative lawsuits. Furthermore, if the
board and the auctioneers collude to not maximize value for shareholders, this would
violate the directors' duty to act in good faith. See In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders
Litigation, supra note 65.
Shareholders could try to bring an action alleging that the auctioneer breached its
fiduciary duties to them. In one withdrawn opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court found
that investment bankers advising a target corporation had a fiduciary duty to its minority
shareholders. Weinburger v. UOP, Inc., 8 Del. J. Corp. L. 162 (1982) (withdrawn).
This withdrawn decision has not been followed by other Delaware courts. In addition,
shareholders could bring several other types of direct actions against the auctioneers,
including claims under the federal securities laws or for common law fraud, although
these claims require proof of scienter. Rosenbloom supra note 55, at 599; Comment,
Third Party Advisor Liability, supra note 8, at 611. Also, a claim of negligent
misrepresentation could be brought where shareholders can show they acted in reliance
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derivative suits on the substantive charge, would make direct claims
against the auctioneer far easier to bring. Thus, Schneider threatens
greater amounts of expensive litigation.
Nevertheless, Schneider might be the stimulus needed to force
reforms aimed at perceived conflict of interest problems with public
company auctioneers. For example, claims that investment bankers hired
by special committees (at the recommendation of management) act to
favor management-backed bidders,' or that investment bankers have too
many roles in these transactions," have concerned the courts and
commentators. Schneider, by allowing shareholders a direct action
against auctioneers, may lead auctioneers to behave more independently
from management. This increased independence could be reflected in
changes in industry practices through improved self-regulation of conflicts
of interest"1 and better structured compensation agreements.'
Of
course, these same changes could take place through private action, or as
a result of SEC regulations," which could be implemented at significantly lower cost.

Even if some form of direct liability is needed to stop auctioneers
from catering to managements' desires, rather than properly informing
directors, a more limited liability regime could have this result. Indeed,
holding auctioneers liable for a maximum of the amount of the fees they
earn on the transaction, and forbidding indemnification or insurance
against this loss, could have the desired impact without the additional
on the investment bankers' advice. See supra note 53 for further discussion of the
limitations on this claim.
79.
See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 569-71, 600-01.
In some
transactions, investment bankers give financial advice to the board of directors, provide
bridge loan financing and underwrite securities for the acquiror, and issue fairness
opinions to the public shareholders. The potential conflicts for an investment banker in
this situation are significant. Id.
80.
Investment bankers can act to prevent any sale of the company. See supra
note 36. Schneider could also have the perverse effect of increasing investment bankers'
desire to accommodate an entrenched management's wishes. * After all, bankers'
indemnification protections are frequently negotiated with management. It is conceivable
that entrenched management might be more willing to give pliant investment bankers
greater protections against Schneider liability in exchange for an informal agreement to
favor a friendly bidder. Of course, such collusion could take place anyway, but
auctioneers' Schneider liability gives entrenched management another bargaining
advantage.
81.
See Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 591-92.
82.
In particular, public company auctioneers conflicts would be reduced if they
were compensated only with a percentage of the sale price of the company and prohibited
from acting in other roles in the transaction.
83.
The SEC has greatly expanded its disclosure requirements in this area.
Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 585-89; Fiflis, supra note 54, at 4-6.
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costs."4
As a policy matter, Schneider's agency model of the corporation-directors as agents of shareholders, and investment bankers. as
agents of directors-could be justified as an attempt to keep directors
faithful to the corporation in a "final period" situation.85 In the final
period of the corporation's life, directors may act opportunistically to
benefit themselves. Society could make directors liable under agency
principles to attempt to prevent this conduct, which would also make
auctioneers liable to shareholders (as agents of an agent) under agency
principles.
Even if this agency liability would have beneficial effects on director
conduct, which is unclear," there are strong policy arguments against
extending agency liability to auctioneers. For example, Schneider's
duplicative enforcement regime creates a potentially serious conflict of
interest. If investment bankers are going to be held directly liable to
shareholders for the outcome of an auction, are they going to allow the
board of directors to decide who will be the buyer of the corporation?
Do we want investment bankers to determine who comes to the
auction, how long the auction runs, what the auction rules are and who
wins? 8 A myriad of these conflicts could arise, including questions
about which bid is highest, or who should be eligible to bid. The
Schneider test transforms the relationship between a board and its banker
into a potentially adversarial one.
The problems created by the Schneider decision extend much further
though. Schneider changes the legal status of directors. If directors are
viewed as agents during a sale of the corporation this has serious
implications for their liability and behavior. For example, under
84.
See Alfred F. Conard, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for
Negligence, 1972 DUKE L.J. 895.
85.
Final period problems arise whenever a corporation is being sold to a new
owner because directors and managers have less incentive to be faithful to employees
when their jobs 'will no longer exist. Thus, in this end game, directors and managers have
greater reason to act opportunistically and engage in hidden self-dealing.
86.
As noted above, shareholders already have a direct action against directors
for breaching their fiduciary duties in selling a corporation. This would be the same
claim that a seller would make against a common law auctioneer. See supra Section
III.A. The principal difference would be that under the corporate law standard, directors
are only liable for gross negligence in conducting the sale, see Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), whereas the common law standard is simple negligence. See supra
Section III. This change does not seem likely to have much effect on director behavior,
especially after indemnification and insurance coverage are taken into account. See
Conard, supra note 84.
87.
Rosenbloom, supra note 54, at 577.
88.
Id. at 579.
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corporate law principles, directors conduct auctions in the manner they
decide is in the best interests of the shareholders. Agency law would
require directors to follow the shareholders' instructions about how to
conduct the auction. Giving shareholders complete discretion over how
to conduct the auction and how to determine which bid to accept creates
another serious potential conflict of interest. Some shareholders may
choose to sacrifice other shareholders' interests. Nor is it clear which
shareholders the board should be listening to. What if there is no
consensus among shareholders about how to sell the company? Equally
importantly, are all shareholders to be given the same voice, or should
long term shareholders' votes be given more weight than arbitrageurs?
Making directors the agents of shareholders would also destroy the
limited liability protections afforded by the corporate form. The
shareholders, as principals, would be liable for the agents' misdeeds that
are committed in the conduct of the principal's business. Shareholders
could thus be liable for a wide variety of directors' misdeeds, such as
potential fraudulent conveyance claims in leveraged buyouts.
More importantly for our purposes, the case opens a new door for
shareholders to sue advisors for simple negligence.89 Schneider removes
a major impediment to shareholder suits against advisors/auctioneers:
under previous Delaware law, plaintiffs had to prove that the auctioneer
knowingly participated in a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties to the
shareholders. If directors are agents of the shareholders instead of
fiduciaries, then the advisors become agents of agents and are therefore
liable to their principals (the RJR shareholders) for acts of simple
negligence.
Under Schneider, advisors/auctioneers could be sued by any bidder,
in its capacity as a stockholder of the company, claiming that the
auctioneer failed to run a fair auction-for example, that the auctioneer
negligently valued its bid; improperly deprived it of information; deprived
it of a chance to re-bid; or otherwise tilted the playing field.' These
bidder suits would impair auction conduct, as auctioneers worry more
about bidders' claims than about maximizing revenues.
It is also clear from our description of general auctioneer liability9
that Schneider is inconsistent with the legal regime that governs
noncorporate auctioneers' relationships with bidders. For example, in
89.
See also supra note 53 (discussion of other types of suits against any advisors
to the board).
90.
This claim against the advisors would piggy-back on suits against the board
of directors for breach of its fiduciary duty to run a fair auction. See, e.g., Samjens
Partners I v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 614, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (board has
a fiduciary duty to its shareholders to conduct auction fairly).
91.
See supra Section IlI.A for this discussion.
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other types of auctions, auctioneers have no duties to third parties, such
as disappointed bidders.' Sellers are generally prohibited from bidding
on the goods that they are auctioning. Because the principal cannot
compete with the bidders, the principal has strong incentives to design
the auction to maximize its expected revenues. Schneider could distort
these incentives because it fails to discriminate between those buyers/bidders who are also shareholders, and who could under agency law
be considered principals of the auctioneer with all the rights and remedies
of principals, and buyers/bidders who have no relationship to the seller,
who would have little or no legal recourse against the auctioneer under
agency law.
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INCREASED AUCTIONEER LIABILITY

The purpose of this section of the paper is to make predictions
concerning Schneider's effect on corporate auctions. We focus on the
prices charged by auctioneers for their services; on the indemnifications
offered by boards to auctioneers; on the means-of-payment used by
corporate acquirors to buy other companies at auction; on the prices
auctioned companies can be expected to receive; and on the net effect on
selling company shareholders. To accomplish this, we first look into the
effect of increased liability on the prices for auctioneer's services and on
the nature of any indemnification contracts offered to the auctioneers.
This analysis relies on a principal/agent model. We predict that Schneider
will cause indemnification contracts between selling companies and
auctioneers to broaden so as to cover any new legal liability. Given our
prediction that all of the increased legal liability will end up being borne
directly by the selling corporation through wider auctioneer indemnification clauses, we then analyze the effect this development will have on
auction prices for the selling company. This analysis relies on auction
theory; accordingly, we give a brief review of the necessary theoretical
components before applying the theory to auctions of companies with
increased potential legal liability.
A. Effects on Auctioneers' Prices, Indemnification Contracts, and
Auctioneer Due Diligence
Under Schneider, corporate auctioneers face increased legal liability
and, therefore, increased expected costs of doing business. If the
auctioneers are not indemnified for their increased legal liability, there
will be two immediate effects: first, the prices for auctioneer services
92.

See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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will increase; and second, auctioneers will take what actions they can
(optimally) to improve their performance and reduce their expected legal
liability.
The conventional economic view of the negligence standard is that
it demands that defendants engage in a weighing of the costs and benefits
of preventive measures. Additional precautions should be taken when the
burden of the precaution is less than or equal to the probability of an
injury occurring times the size of the injury if one occurs." The shift
from aiding and abetting liability to the Schneider negligence standard will
increase the probability of a finding that an injury has occurred. This will
cause firms to take additional precautions to reduce their potential
liability.
Some of these precautions could accrue as benefits to the selling
company shareholders if they improve the auction process (for example,
improved industry self-regulation may lead to fewer conflicts of interest
or better standardized valuation techniques). Yet, the tremendous size of
the potential liability, over $1 billion in the Schneider case, combined
with the possibility of jury error in assessing what the proper level of
precautions should have been, could lead auctioneers to take excessive
precautions. Furthermore, in those areas where auctioneers must exercise
judgment, such as how many bidders to invite or what projections to use,
the threat of increased liability will not produce an improved auction
process, but rather litigation avoidance behavior.
In weighing the net effect of the changed legal regime on selling
company shareholders, we begin by determining the elements of the price
increase for auctioneer services due to Schneider. We identify five
separate components to this increase: increased settlement costs,
increased costs due to litigation avoiding behavior, increased legal fees,
risk premiums in auctioneer fees, and an "auction uncertainty premium."
The increase in price is then compared to the benefits to selling company
shareholders. Here we find two components of benefits-proceeds from
successful lawsuits and potential improvements in auction quality. We
present two arguments as to why the price increase will likely outweigh
any increase in benefits provided; we will first describe in general .terms
these two arguments and then analyze them in depth. 4
93.
Judge Learned Hand is generally credited for this formulation of the
negligence standard. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.
1947).
94.
We should note at this point that we are assuming well-functioning auction
markets in the sense that bidders respond rationally to changes in the legal regime. This
does not mean that we assume away all market imperfections; it just means that the
response to the one change that we focus on is rational. Although the auction-theoretic
literature always assumes rational behavior, and empirical evidence from real-world data
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Our first argument as to why the price increase must outweigh any
incremental benefits relies on a qualitative evaluation of the price
increase relative to any benefits. We argue that the price increase will be
large because of risk aversion of the auctioneers and the tremendous
amount of risk being borne (e.g., $1 billion of potential damages in
Schneider).95 Conversely, we argue that the incremental benefits will be
small because the incentives will be for auctioneers to minimize legal
liability, not to maximize auction efficiency, and because in what will be
a major area of litigation-valuation of non-cash bids-there is relatively
little that auctioneers can do to improve the ex post accuracy of their
advice.'
Our second argument as to why the price increase must outweigh any
incremental benefit is in a sense just a formalization of our first argument,
but it also highlights what may be the essence of the issue. If directors

act in the interests of shareholders (a large assumption that we return to
address), then they will contract for an economically efficient level of
quality and care from their advisors.

If shareholders could commit

themselves to not sue ex post if the advice given is incorrect, then
advisors would be willing to enter a contract that asked and paid for the
efficient level of advice. Under Schneider, however, shareholders cannot
commit themselves to not sue even if the advisors fulfilled the ex ante
terms of the deal. Indeed, it should be expected that shareholders will sue

whenever the expected benefits of bringing a case exceed the costs, and
often confirms this, experimental auction work has turned up violations of the theoretical
predictions. For a review of the evidence, see Robert G. Hansen & John R. Lott,
Comment, The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1991).
95.
See Christopher D. Stone, The Place of EnterpriseLiability in the Control of
CorporateConduct, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 52-53 n.202. To say that the investment bank is risk
averse, means that it is willing to pay more to avoid a loss than the true expected value
of the loss. Dale H. Oesterle, Limits on a Corporation'sProtection of its Directorsand
Officers from PersonalLiability, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 513, 523 n.23. If the banker is
forced to bear this risk, and the banker is risk averse, then it will demand an increase in
its fees greater than the expected value of the loss to compensate it for assuming this risk.
Id. If the banker could buy insurance against this risk, which it cannot presently do, the
insurance company would charge at least the amount of the expected loss plus a
reasonable profit margin. Id. This insurance would be unlikely to cover acts of willful
misconduct by the auctioneer though unless the auctioneer continued to bear some
financial responsibility for any possible misconduct. Id. at 523-24. Furthermore, as the
size of the expected losses increased, fewer corporations would purchase insurance,
rendering it increasingly difficult to estimate total future losses and insure these risks. Id.
at 524.
96. • Some commentators argue that Schneider yields an additional benefit of
forcing corporate advisors to monitor directors. See Fiflis, supra note 54, at 41-47. See
infra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
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this will occur in many instances when the advice was ex ante good but
expost incorrect. To protect themselves in such a situation, advisors will
necessarily provide more than the efficient level of quality and care. This
means that the costs of additional quality exceed the benefits. If we are
correct in these arguments, we should then expect to see selling companies avoid the net cost of Schneider by indemnifying their auctioneers.
After further analysis of Schneider's net cost, we return to discuss current
and expected indemnification arrangements.
To substantiate our arguments on the net cost of Schneider, we begin
by analyzing the necessary increase in auctioneer prices if Schneider is the
operative legal standard. The five components of this price increase
relative to the costs incurred Under a pre-Schneider regime are:
(A1)
(A2)
(A3)
(A4)
(A5)

Increased costs due to the direct settlement costs of the
expected number and size of lawsuits arising out of a given
deal;
Increased costs due to actions taken by the auctioneer to
reduce legal liability;
Litigation costs;
A risk premium since the auctioneers are likely to be risk
averse and their net fees are now being made very
stochastic;9" and
What we term an "auction uncertainty premium" that arises
if auctioneer prices are themselves set through an auction
process.'

Let us now view this situation from the selling corporation's
shareholders' viewpoint. The Schneider decision gives selling company
shareholders a cause of action against the auctioneer for simple negligence
in conducting an auction of the shareholders' property. The benefits of
this new legal regime for the shareholders will be two-fold:
(Si)
(S2)

Direct settlements from Schneider lawsuits; and
Any net benefits deriving from actions taken by the

97.
By settlement costs, we mean both out-of-court settlements and court
judgments. Litigation costs are considered separately.
98.
Net fees-fees minus settlements and litigations costs-are stochastic because
settlements and litigation costs are uncertain. Auctioneers are assumed to be risk-averse
in that they prefer a certain payment of x over an uncertain lottery that has expected value
of x. Risk aversion is a reasonable assumption here because many advisors are private
corporations or partnerships where the owners are not well-diversified.
99.
See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text for elaboration of this point.
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auctioneer to reduce their legal liability.iw
In comparing the costs and benefits of the Schneider legal regime to
shareholders, one first notices that (S1) and (Al) cancel one another; what
shareholders expect to receive from Schneider lawsuits they must also
expect to pay in increased prices for auctioneer services. Thus, the
comparison of costs versus benefits simplifies to weighing the costs A2
through A5 against the net benefit S2.
First, we present a qualitative argument concerning the relative size
of these costs and benefits. We should expect A4 to be relatively large
because of the size of the potential liability auctioneers assume. A $1
billion settlement-which could conceivably emerge from Schneider-would be enough to wipe out the equity of even the largest public
investment banks. 1 When one considers the effect of such a liability
on smaller investment banks, consulting firms, and law firms, one must
conclude that these entities would effectively be prohibited from
participating in the auction market."' Second, cost A5-the auction
uncertainty premium-will also be significant, because auctioneers will
likely differ greatly in their estimates of what the Schneider liability in
any given case will be. As we establish below, this heterogeneity creates
a sort of market power in the auction context and therefore gives bidders
an opportunity strategically to increase prices. 1 3
Now consider the potential incremental benefits to the selling
company's shareholders. We have already noted that the incentive for
auctioneers is to minimize legal liability, rather than maximize auction
efficiency. 4 For example, to protect themselves from suits by disgruntled bidder/shareholders, we expect auctioneers to exclude fewer bidders
from participation in final rounds of bidding and to be even more
complete in their disclosure of relevant information about the selling
company. Yet both of these actions may lower the expected price
received for the selling company, for they result in more widespread
100.
We qualify this as a "net" benefit for it is not clear that actions taken by
advisors will be in the interests of running a more efficient auction for the shareholders'
benefit.
101.
Auctioneers may also withdraw their services entirely from small or
financially risky firms. See, e.g., Reiner H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies
and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 891-92 (1984).
102.
One could even envision syndication of the risk taking place, much as
investment banks syndicate the financial risk of securities underwritings. But such
syndication also comes at a significant cost.
103.
In this auction, bidders are selling a service so that higher prices make the
buyer of the service, the corporation, worse off. See infra notes 132-33 and accompanying text for further discussion of why heterogeneity creates market power in auctions.
104.
See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of potentially sensitive information. 5
Second, suppose that some of the actions taken by auctioneers to
reduce their legal liability actually do serve to enhance the auction
process. How much room is there for improvement? Consider the issue
of valuation of non-cash bids, one which would certainly be a ripe area

for shareholder litigation. The amount of uncertainty in a security
valuation that is unresolvable-at least, unresolvable without tremendous
resources-is necessarily very large, for a valuation depends upon
forecasts of market-based discount rates and forecasts of company-specific
performance." ° In fact, it is safe to say that any ex ante valuation will
turn out ex post to be wrong."°7 This does not imply that all valuations
are equally poor, for it is possible to reduce a significant amount of
uncertainty through a careful and unbiased analysis. But even after doing
all they can reasonably do to reduce uncertainty, auctioneers will be left
with inaccurate valuations that will give rise to Schneider lawsuits.

Selling company shareholders pay a large price increment in return for a
marginal improvement in auctioneer advice."'0
Indeed, the Schneider case itself presents a good example of the
results created by applying a negligence standard to the complex valuation
problems faced by auctioneers. Both bids received by the RJR Special
Committee included enormous dollar value amounts of complex securities
that were designed to allow RJR's current shareholders to participate in
the potential future benefits of a healthy corporation. The size of these

105.
See Hansen, supra note 25, for further elaboration of why it is efficient to
restrict both bidders and disclosure when selling a company. It is doubtful that a jury
would ever find an auctioneer guilty of negligence for inviting too many bidders, for the
cost of that action is necessarily difficult to quantify.
106.
For a description of several common valuation methodologies used by
investment bankers and their dependence on certain assumptions, see Arthur H.
Rosenbloom & Arthur H. Aufses III, On UnderstandingInvestment Banker Liability, 4
INSIGHTS, Apr. 1990, at 3-4. Even if we have investment bankers independently verify
every piece of information they are given by the company, a tremendously expensive
process, these estimates may be of lower quality than company estimates.
See
Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 578.
107.
See Oesterle & Norberg, supra note 3, at 255 nn. 155-56. The RJR valuation
exercise is an outstanding example of this problem; the subsequent market value of the
securities issued in that buy-out greatly exceeded the Special Committee's investment
advisors' ex ante estimates.
108.
Other actions that might improve the quality of auctioneer services, such as
investment banker self-regulation and greatly expanded disclosure requirements, see
Rosenbloom, supra note 55, at 591-92, could be implemented by the industry and the SEC
independently of the legal liability standard for auctioneers. These changes could reduce
technical mistakes and failures to take proper care by providing better standards for the
industry and exposing shoddy work to the public. The SEC has been very active in this
area. Id. at 585-89.
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security issuances dwarfed anything ever issued before. When coupled
with the complex terms of the securities in the RJR deal, this made it
impossible for the auctioneers to value the securities with any real
certainty. The investment bankers' valuations of the securities were by
necessity based on assumptions about the trading value of the securities.
These assumptions will be, at most, only marginally improved by telling
the bankers that they will be sued for mistakes found in after-the-fact
valuations. A more likely effect of increased liability for valuation
mistakes is that auctioneers will become too cautious in soliciting bids.
Many will seek all cash bids, instead of potentially higher bids involving
a mix of cash and securities," ° because of their fear of being sued for
improper valuation of the bids."'
Some commentators would counter our arguments here by saying that
an increased threat of a shareholder suit forces corporate advisors to act
as monitors of director conduct."' In other words, the argument is that
auctioneer/advisors act as "gatekeepers,"11 and that it would be
worthwhile for shareholders to pay for this service through increased
auctioneers' fees and, perhaps, less efficient auctions. The idea of using
auctioneers to better regulate director conduct has appeal: auctioneers are
outsiders with independent reputations that have influence in shaping how
the directors conduct the auction, and they are likely to have little to gain
109.
See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
110.
The potential inhibiting effect of heavy personal liability on the willingness
of actors to engage in innovative or high risk behavior has been discussed in a variety of
contexts. See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 95, at 514 n.3 (discussing director and officer
liability).
111.
Retaining an investment banker to act as an auctioneer can serve as a
monitoring device against management misconduct when the bankers diligently perform
their job and offer their market reputations as "hostages" for the quality of their work.
See Robert J. Giurffra, Jr., Note, Investment Bankers' Fairness Opinions in Corporate
Control Transactions,96 YALE L.J. 119, 126 (1986). On the other hand, if management
corrupts the investment banker auctioneer, inducing it to act in management's self-interest,
then employing the auctioneer will serve to insulate further managers from shareholder
scrutiny. Id. at 127-130; Oesterle & Norberg, supranote 3 at 211-12 (when shareholders
and managers' interests diverge in a sale of the corporation, investment bankers may serve
-only to "hoodwink" shareholders by offering ostensibly fair valuations to support
management's self-interested behavior). It appears from some litigated cases that
investment bankers are not acting as open-minded experts, but rather as producers of
made-to-order opinions that support management's pre-established positions. Id. at 211.
See also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, Fairness Opinions: How Fair Are They
And What Can Be Done About it?, 1989 DUKE L.J. 27.
112.
See Kraakman, supra note 101, at 889; Reiner H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:
The Anatomy of Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 54 n.3
(1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers]; Stone, supra note 95, at 47.
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and much to lose from covering up the directors' misdeeds."' Imposing gatekeeper liability is costly though-as we have just argued-since
investment bankers will demand compensation for assuming these duties.
This demand will penalize innocent clients and encourage the entry into
the market of low-quality competitors. Investment bankers may also
refuse to accept high risk cases, precisely the group of firms most in need
of their services.11 It may also be easy for management to select
investment bankers that are corrupt or willing to assume personal liability
for a price,"' although this will be more difficult with diversified
investment banking firms that have widespread client bases and wellknown reputations," 6 and to fire bankers that try to stop abuses.
We also note that Delaware law already imposes gatekeeper liability
on investment banker auctioneers with respect to director misconduct
because auctioneers have a duty not to aid and abet director miscon17
duct.Y
In short, imposing an additional "gatekeeper" duty would
result in little, if any, improvement in director performance. Misconduct
involving both the special committee and the auctioneer, such as an
agreement to award the company to a favored bidder, could be attacked
by shareholders under the existing aiding and abetting legal standard.
Nor would this type of intentional misconduct by auctioneers be covered
by existing indemnification agreements.
The second argument as to why the costs of increased auctioneer
liability must exceed the benefits begins by recognizing that the market
for corporate auctioneers, like most markets, provides a trade-off between
increased quality of advice and the price paid. It would be naive to think
that the market for auctioneer services is one where quality either does
not matter or cannot be varied. In fact, reputation of advisors is a key
component of competition among corporate advisors such as investment
banks," 8 and there are well-established quality tiers-that is, a corporation chooses its level of advice quality by choosing among well-recog113.
Kraakman, supra note 101, at 890-91.
114.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 112, at 75-78.
115.
Kraakman, supra note 101, at 891-92.
116.
Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 112, at 71-72, 96-97.
117.
See id. at 74 n.66, 84 n.93.
118.
See, e.g, James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith 11, Capital Raising,
Underwriting and the Certification Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986). These
authors argue that the reputation of investment banks serve to certify the value of initial
public offerings.
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nized tiers of advisors. 19 And once an advisor is chosen, that advisor
can also offer a trade-off between advice quality and price by, among
other things, varying the time spent and number of professionals used on
the case.
Assuming for now that directors work in the shareholders' interests,
then they will, in the absence of Schneider, choose that quality of advice
which just balances A2 and S2, the marginal costs and marginal benefits
of increased auctioneer advice quality."
Figure 1 makes this point
graphically.
Figure 1
Auctioneer Quality, Pre- and Post-Schneider
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119.
For a general description of the tiers of investment banks, See SAMUEL
HAYES III ET AL., COMPETiTION INTHE INVESTMENT BANKING INDUSTRY (1983). in one
article that argues investment bankers' reputations serve to certify the value of new
securities offerings, it is also shown that bankers doing a poor job of pricing their issues
tend to lose market share in subsequent periods. See Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter,
Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Underpricing of Initial Public'Offerings, 15 J.

FiN.

ECON.

213 (1986).

120.
Following our definition of negligence, see supra text accompanying note 93,
this level of quality is the only one which, theoretically, should not be considered
negligent. Thus, the non-negligent level of quality is the efficient level, and directors who
act in the shareholders' interests will want to purchase that amount.
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Shareholders are wealthiest when the optimal level of quality is
chosen."' This is not, of course, a level of quality that ensures no
mistakes ex post, and therein lies the problem. Under Schneider, any
mistake that becomes obvious ex post will provide material for a
shareholders' suit that the level of care taken was negligent. It seems
unlikely that a jury will be able perfectly to determine whether a mistake
was due to negligence or simply to the turn of events, so that advisors
who provide an ex ante optimal care level will find themselves successfully sued for negligence. Shareholders also cannot commit themselves ex
ante to not bring such opportunistic suits. The obvious thing for advisors
to do then, under Schneider, is to increase the quality of advice so as to
minimize the grounds for any lawsuits. But since the quality level
without Schneider should be the optimal level, any increase is inefficient,
that is, it imposes greater costs than benefits on shareholders.
Recognizing the agency problem between directors and shareholders
raises two additional issues. Directors might further their own interests
at the expense of shareholders by contracting for an inefficient level of
advice quality or by employing advisors who will deliberately present
biased advice that helps the directors directly (e.g., that ensures a favored
bidder will win). Concerning quality of advice, it would seem that
directors are most likely to choose too-high a quality level, for this
reduces their potential liability to shareholders. If this is the case, our
points of above still hold. Concerning the hiring of deliberately biased
advisors, we concede that Schneider can make such a practice riskier for
advisors and might therefore reduce the occurrence of such breaches of
fiduciary duty obligations. As in our above discussion of the "gatekeeper" role of advisors, we would question whether this benefit of Schneider
outweighs its obvious costs, and we would also note that Delaware law
already allows shareholders to sue advisors who aid and abet directors
who violate their fiduciary' duties.
If we are right in our assessment of the costs and benefits of
Schneider to selling company shareholders, then we should find that the
121.
We are essentially arguing that the level of care to be taken in providing
auctioneer services is a choice that can be made ex ante, that is, before the auctioneer is
hired. The reason for this is that auctioneers compete with one another by committing
themselves to different levels of quality. Auctioneers that deviate from their reputed
quality will be punished by fewer transactions in the future (that is, as bidders and
directors observe the low level of quality, they will decide to use a different advisor in
the future). See, e.g., Randall Smith, Deal-Shock: Wasserstein Falls in the Ranking,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1991, at C1 (auctioneer that was found potentially personally liable
for aiding and abetting breach of directors' fiduciary duties in improperly conducting an
auction of a major American corporation estimates that it has cost his firm 10-15% of its
business).
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selling corporation will choose to indemnify its advisors against the
simple negligence suits that will arise from Schneider. Instead of
passively accepting a court decision that imposes a net cost on them,
selling corporations will contract around the regime change through
indemnification agreements. We have also argued that any improvements

in the conduct of the auction from increased liability are likely to be de
minimus, while the real costs of increased liability are high. Thus,
society should not stop the parties from freely contracting for indemnification. To understand how these indemnification agreements are likely to
work, we will briefly review how current indemnification practices

operate. ,22
Investment bankers and other advisors performing services for
companies often request that the company agree to indemnify them for
any losses that they suffer in the course of performing the services.2
122.
As mentioned above, supra note 43 and accompanying text, the standard
Sotheby's contract gives Sotheby's complete direction on how the auction is to be
conducted and limits the ability of sellers to sue Sotheby's over disagreements on
procedure. This practice is consistent with what we argue above.
123.
Historically, investment bankers have sought indemnification rather than other
equivalent forms of protection from legal liability, such as ex ante waivers by the
corporation of its right to sue, or separate insurance policies, to cover these risks. State
corporate laws authorize corporations to enter into binding agreements to indemnify its
agents in future controversies. See Oesterle, PersonalLiabilityProtection,supra note 95,
at 543-45 (discussing standards for indemnifying officers and directors of the corporation).
These agreements do not, however provide complete protection for auctioneers. If the
client corporation goes bankrupt, this could render the indemnification agreement
unenforceable. There are also limitations on the coverage of indemnification. See infra
notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
Waivers would avoid most of the litigation expense associated with enforcing the
Schneider standard. Agency and trust law principles suggest that waivers of the
corporation's right to sue for negligent, or even grossly negligent conduct, are
enforceable. Oesterle, supra note 95, at 554, 572. However, granting an ex ante waiver
lays the corporation open to criticism by its shareholders for giving up its right to judicial
recourse against misconduct, which may explain their infrequent usage. Id. at 572. A
more limited version of the waiver would allow bankers to restrict damages to the amount
of compensation that the banker received for its auctioneer services. Coffee, supra note
62, at 6.
Alternatively, the target corporation is statutorily authorized in most states to
purchase insurance policies that insure it against the risk of misconduct of its agent, the
auctioneer. Oesterle, supra note 95, at 550. These agreements will be enforceable if they
are restricted to claims of negligent or grossly negligent behavior. See id. at 550-51, 561
(claiming that the judicial trend is to enforce policies that cover even intentional
misconduct by the insured so as to insure that injured parties receive full compensation).
Insurance would have the advantage of introducing the insurer as a monitor of auctioneer
conduct and could be used to spread the risks of large judgments against auctioneers.
Insurance has the disadvantage of tying the target corporation to the decisions of a
third party, the insurance company, that may not offer the amount of coverage desired,
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Indemnification shifts potential legal liabilities from the advisors onto the
hiring corporation."
In the case of corporate auctions, the selling
company indemnifies the auctioneer." s Standard engagement letters
between selling corporations and investment bankers include broad
indemnification provisions, such as "Itihe Company agrees to indemnify
and hold Investment Banker harmless against any and all losses, claims,
damages, liabilities, or expenses, joint or several, to which Investment
Banker may become subject arising from or in connection with the
services."" Typically, there is also a clause stating that the indemnification holds only if the advisor is not finally adjudged to have committed
"willful misfeasance or gross negligence" in performing its duties."z
The breadth of the exclusions contained in the indemnification letter is a
matter for negotiation between the company and its advisor."
While existing indemnification provisions may not cover simple
negligence suits stemming from Schneider, there is already evidence that
indemnification agreements are being re-drafted specifically to cover the
new liability."

Such indemnification is generally legally permissi-

or may charge extremely high premiums for the coverage. Id. at 570. For example,
insurance premiums for professionals such as accountants and lawyers that act as advisors
to savings and loan associations are projected to increase by amounts ranging from 15%
to 30% over the next year because of the increased incidence of lawsuits against these
advisors. Sherry R. Sontag, Soured Deals Snag More Professionals, NAT'L L.J., Feb.
4, 1991, at 31. For a further discussion of the problems of using insurance to offset tort
liability, see Silicano, supra note 53, at 1948-50.
For an excellent discussion of the interplay between the currently permitted
strategies of indemnification, insurance and waiver, see generally Oesterle, supra note 95,
at 561-66.
124.
Indemnification agreements may shift the impact of liability from the advisors
to the corporation. Oesterle, supra note 95, at 513 n.1. The risk of large personal debts
from litigation over their official actions leads investment bankers to demand protection
or compensation from the target corporation against these potential liabilities. See id. at
518.
125.
Giuffra, supra note 111, at 140; 1 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H.
STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS at 8-5 (1991).
Indemnification is also
widespread for officers and directors of corporations. Clifford G. Holdemess, Liability
Insurers as CorporateMonitors, 10 INT'L REV. L. ECON. 115, 116 n.6 (i990) (99% of
corporations surveyed indemnified directors and officers).
126.

2 LIPTON & STEINBEROER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS at C-22 (1990) (form

of engagement letter with respect to takeover defense).
127.
Id.
128.
Giuffra, supra note 111, at 140 n.122.
129.
While investment bankers traditionally have obtained indemnification from
the company, if the Special Committee is indeed to be deemed the "agent" for the
shareholders in this. context, consideration should be given by counsel to investment
bankers to seeking additional protections in the engagement letter to be binding both upon
the company and its shareholders (e.g., choice of forum clause, waiver of trial by jury).
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ble.' 30
Of course, the story on Schneider's impact cannot end here; with
indemnification, the legal liability is merely retained by the selling
corporation. This will in turn influence the price that the selling
corporation can be expected to fetch at auction-for the purchaser of the
selling corporation will in the end be the entity which bears the cost of
any payments from Schneider litigation. To analyze the effect on auction
prices, we turn to auction theory.
B. Effects on Auction Prices When the Selling CorporationIndemnifies
the Auctioneer

If the purchaser ends up with the financial liability arising from
Schneider cases, how will this be reflected in bids for the selling

corporation? A first approximation would be that bids would be reduced
by the expected financial liability assumed by the purchaser. This implies
that selling corporations are made worse off by Schneider only to the

extent of litigation costs, for settlement payments are a wash: Bids are
reduced by expected settlements, but those expected settlements are
received by selling corporation shareholders.
Auction theory, however, implies that the expected price for the
selling company will fall by more than the expected financial liability of

Schneider suits, even if bidders are risk neutral. We state this formally
as Proposition 3 below. For now, we will attempt to give an intuitive

understanding of the result: Under the Schneider legal regime, bidders
for a corporation must realize that they are buying a potential financial
Herbert M. Wachtell et al., Investment Banker Liability to Shareholders in the Sale-ofControl Context, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 1990, at 1, 4. See also ROSENBLOOM, supra note 55,
at 595-96 (suggesting expanded indemnification rights, contribution undertakings limited
to amount of fees paid, waiver of jury trial and forum restrictions).
130.
Statutory authorization of indemnification against agent's liabilities arising out
of suits by, or in the name of, the corporation is generally limited: If the agent is
successful in defending the suit, or settles the case without a finding of liability, the
corporation is obligated to pay its reasonable expenses; however, if the agent is adjudged
liable in the suit to the corporation, then the corporation may not indemnify the agent
under the terms of the statute. See, e.g., MODEL BusINEss CORP. AcT § 8.51, 8.56
(1989). Contractual agreements respecting indemnification, on the other hand, are not
limited by these restrictions and may provide much broader protections subject only to the
limitation that the indemnification offered may not be inconsistent with public policy, Id.
at § 8.56 (3) cmt.; see also Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 344 (Del.
1983) (stating that Delaware corporation could grant indemnification broader than statute
provided). To the extent that auctioneers cannot be indemnified against these liabilities,
we would expect them to raise the price for their services to compensate themselves for
the increased risk of liability.
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liability arising out of Schneider lawsuits, as well as the corporation itself.
Thus, rational bidders must reduce the amount they are willing to pay for
this "package" of corporation and legal liability together. But the actual
dollar amount of any Schneider liability will be unknown to any bidder
ex ante, so the overall financial uncertainty associated with the package
is higher than that of the corporation value itself.13 ' But for reasons
detailed below, uncertainty is anathema to auction prices; with greater
uncertainty, bidders will naturally lower their bids (partly to protect
themselves from losses, and partly out of opportunism-there is a good
chance that other bidders will think the package is worth much less). For
this reason, the expected value of the auction price will decline by more
than just the expected value of the Schneider liability.
To investigate this further, consider an auction where n bidders
compete via sealed-bids for the right to purchase an item of uncertain
value. Suppose as a first case that all bidders have the same information
on the item's value, so that the expected value of the item is the same to
all bidders. Call this expected value E(v). Then in a sealed-bid auction
the Nash equilibrium bid strategy is for all bidders to submit a bid of

E(v): although this bid gives no expected profit to any bidder, to deviate
unilaterally from the strategy (bid something other than E(v)) would entail
either a certainty of winning but at a loss, or it would entail losing for
131.
More formally, let A be a bidder's estimate of asset value and let L be the
bidder's estimate of Schneider legal liability being assumed. Then the joint value is A L and the variance of this is
var(A - L) = var(A) + var(L) - 2 cov(A,L)
Thus, the variance of the joint value is definitely greater than var(A) if cov(A,L) is
negative or positive and not too large. It is not at all clear that estimates of asset value
and liability should be anything other than independent of one another; and if anything one
would suspect negative covariance: if A is estimated to be high, then a bidder could infer
that the sale price of the company will also be high. In this case, one could also
reasonably infer that L will be low, for the selling company shareholders have received
a high price and will be either unlikely to sue or will receive lower damage payments if
a suit is brought and won. This makes cov(A,L) negative and increases the risk of the
package. In the formal proof of our result below, we assume only that cov(A,L) = 0.
A related issue concerns the possibility of auction price and L being related to one
another. A high price paid might be an effective "bribe" to shareholders, i.e., paying a
high price results in a low L. This introduces a new aspect to bid strategy, and one would
expect higher bids as a result. Our result concerning lower total payments to shareholders
still remains, though. Bidders will only raise their bid if by doing so the expected liability
falls by more than the increase in expected payment. But if that is so, the action makes
shareholders on net worse off. In our discussion, therefore, we ignore the possibility of
L being affected by bid price.
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sure. 32 Thus, with homogeneous information, the seller can, through
an auction, extract the expected value of the item for sale.
What if bidders have different value estimates-for example, if
bidders' value estimates are viewed as independent draws from a
probability distribution whose mean equals the item's true value? In this
case bidders will, in equilibrium, generally find it optimal to bid less than
their estimated values and, as a result, the expected price to the seller will
be less than the item's expected value. In a sense, uncertainty and
heterogeneous information creates an opportunity for bidders to "shave"
strategically their bids because by lowering their bid below their estimated
value, the bidders will not be reducing their probability of winning by one
as was the case with homogeneous information.
To take an example to illustrate this point, suppose that one bidder
estimates the item for sale to be worth $100 million. In the case when all
bidders thought this-and everybody knew what everybody else
thought-then the only reasonable bid would be $100 million. But if
other bidders are likely to have valuations different from $100 million,
the economics of an optimal bid change: Suppose this one bidder now
places a bid of $99 million. Unlike the case with homogeneous value
estimates, the bidder's probability of winning with a $99 million bid will
not drop to zero. Indeed, the chance of winning with $99 million bid will
probably be quite close to the chance of winning with a $100 million bid,
for the bidder only incrementally loses in those cases when one of his
competitors would have bid something between $99 and $100 million.
Traded off against this cost, however, is the fact that upon winning the
bidder pays $1 million less. Generally such a tradeoff will be beneficial,
so all bidders end up bidding less than their expected value.
This is a basic result of auction theory: When selling an item of
uncertain value, the expected selling price will be less than the item's
expected value, and the bidders will have positive- expected profit. We
state this more formally as Proposition 1. '

132.
A Nash equilibrium bidding strategy is defined as follows. First, let b(E(v))
represent a function that maps any bidder's value estimate to a bid. Then b(E(v))
constitutes a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium if b(E(v)) gives the optimal (expected profit
maximizing) bid for any one bidder when all other bidders are believed to also employ
b(E(v)). In other words, in a Nash equilibrium there can be no incentive for any bidder
to unilaterally defect-that is, to switch to a different bid function.
The equilibrium in the text is a weak equilibrium in that there are other bids besides
E(v) that give bidders the same expected profit (which is of course zero). Of course, if
all bidders were to bid something other than E(v), there would be an incentive for any one
bidder to change his strategy.
133.
For a formal model that yields these results, see Douglas K. Reece,
Competitive Biddingfor Offshore Petroleum Leases, 9 BELL J. ECON. 369 (1978).
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Proposition 1
Consider an auction of an item which has value v, assumed to be the
same for all bidders. If v is unknown ex ante to the bidders, but the
bidders have value estimates which are identically and independently
distributed according to a probability function F(v), then if all bidders
follow Nash equilibrium bidding strategies, and bids are in cash, the
following will hold:
(i)
(ii)

The expected selling price will be less than E(v), the
expected value of the auctioned item; and
Each bidder has positive expected profit from participating
in the auction.

Since the seller receives less than the expected value, a natural course
of research would be to investigate actions that a seller can take to
improve the situation. One possible action is suggested by our above
example: When all bidders had the same value estimates, the seller could
extract all of the item's expected value. Thus, it would appear that
making bidders' information less disparate would increase the expected
selling price. One common way of reducing disparity is to provide all
bidders with some common piece of pertinent information, such as a value
estimate done by an appraiser. In private auctions, real estate appraisals
and environmental clean-up cost estimates are normally provided to all
serious bidders. This common information gives all bidders a similar
basis for estimating the value of these corporate assets. Proposition 2
states an important relationship between information and expected selling
prices."
Proposition 2
In auctions of the type described in Proposition 1, provision of
additional information to all bidders concerning the value of the item will
increase the expected selling price.
Using Propositions I and 2, we can now determine the effect on
auction prices for companies when auctioneers are indemnified for
negligence in conducting the auction. As we pointed out above,
indemnifying the advisor means that the auction winner ends up assuming
the financial liability from any (old) shareholder suits. Thus, we can now
think of the sale of the company as consisting of the sale of two parts:
(1) the company; and (2) the financial liability from shareholder suits.
134.
This result is proved in Paul R. Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, A Theory of
Auctions and Competitive Bidding, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1089 (1982).
McAfee &
Mcmillan, supra note 1, at 722 provide a re-statement.
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Our question asks how the inclusion of (2) in the auction will affect the
selling price.
Let E(c) be the expected financial cost of shareholder suits emerging
from the auction. Suppose we sold this liability at a separate hypothetical
auction. Clearly, the price in this auction would have to be negative, for
the purchaser is assuming a liability. Assuming that the actual liability
is of uncertain value, and that bidders would differ in their assessments
of that value, the expected selling price should be less than (-E(c)), the
expected value of the item being sold. In such an auction the seller would
have to pay more than the expected cost to get a bidder to assume the
liability.
This suggests that bundling financial liability from shareholder suits
with the sale of the company itself will reduce the expected selling price
by more than the expected cost of the financial liability. In this case,
selling company shareholders would be made worse off, for although they
receive proceeds from shareholder suits, their expected price falls by even
more (and this is even before the deadweight loss of litigation costs are
taken out).
Proof of this result is a bit more complex because the company and
the liability are auctioned together; the discussion above assumes two
separate auctions. We state our result as Proposition 3 and then prove it
using both Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 3135

Let E(p) be the expected price received in an auction of the company
itself, and let E(c) be the expected settlement cost of shareholder suits.
If E(p*) is the expected price in an auction of the company and the
shareholder suit liability, then

135.
Proof
•E(p*) is the expected selling price for the company and the liability given
uncertainty over both the company's value and the amount of the liability. Suppose that
we now provide perfect information on the liability. Then the expected selling price in
this case, denoted E(p**), will be
E(p**) = E(p) - E(c)
In any given auction, the expected price will be E(p)-c, where c is the actual liability
for that auction.
Taking expectations over all auctions-with different liability
costs-gives us the expression above. This also assumes independence between the
amount of the liability and the company's asset value.
However, from Proposition 2, we know that providing additional information raises
the expected selling price. Thus,
E(p*) < E(p**)
=> E(p*) < E(p) - E(c)

QED
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E(p*) < E(p) - E(c)

The result: Schneider will, assuming indemnification of advisors, result
in lower expected net proceeds for selling company shareholders (net
proceeds being selling price plus any proceeds from shareholder suits).
Schneider therefore makes selling company shareholders worse-off.

C. Secondary Effects of Schneider on CorporationAuctions
In this section we point out one other damaging effect that Schneider
is likely to have on corporate auction markets: a reduction in the use of
non-cash methods of payment. It is, after all, the valuation of a non-cash
bid versus a cash bid that lies at the heart of the Schneider decision.
Cash bids are inherently easier to value and to compare to one another,
so there will be a natural tendency for auctioneers and directors desirous
of minimizing litigation to state a preference for all-cash bids. Non-cash
bids, however, because of their contingent-pricing aspects, are desirable
from both the seller's and the buyer's points of view.'" Propositions
4 and 5 state the two major results concerning non-cash bidding methods:
Proposition 4 37'
If the value of bids depends, at least in part, on the unobserved value
of the selling company, then the seller's expected revenue will be higher
than if the bids were not contingent upon unobserved value.
Proposition 538

There is a greater likelihood of exchange if bids can be made
contingent upon unobserved value than if they cannot.
Examples of bids whose value are contingent upon the selling
company's value would include any form of stock or debt of the
acquiring company for the value of the acquiring company's securities,
which will end up being dependent upon the selling company's value, as
well as the value of any synergies created by the merger. Sometimes one
sees more explicit contingent-pricing methods-for example, new issues
of stock in a newly-created corporation (made up mostly of the selling
company), or future payments that depend explicitly on some measure of
136.
There may be other reasons to prefer non-cash bids, not the least of which
are tax considerations (in some instances the acceptance of securities by the selling
shareholders will allow them to postpone any capital gains tax).
137.
For a more formal treatment, see McAfee & Macmillan, supra note 1.
138.
See Robert G. Hansen, A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in
Mergers and Acquisitions, 60 J. BUS. 75 (1987).
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earnings. "'
The intuition for Proposition 4 can be best seen through an example.
As we have already argued, a selling company will expect to receive less
than its expected value if it sells itself at auction. 1" This assumes,
however, all-cash bids. Suppose instead that the selling company requires
bids to be in the form of a percentage of the selling company's future
earnings. Then equilibrium results in all bidders offering 100% of future
earnings: A bid of anything less leaves a bidder with an expected gain,
hence he should be willing to bid more. Since all bidders would think
similarly, equilibrium calls for all bidders to offer 100% of future
earnings. But in this case, the selling company will end up with 100%
of its expected value (although it receives payment over time). The use
of a contingent payment method has in essence eliminated all variation in
bids, and, again, it is variation in bids that allows bidders the opportunity
to lower strategically their bids. Less extreme forms of contingent
payments-accepting stock or other securities; retaining a royalty
interest-will exhibit the same price-increasing effect, but to a lesser
degree. Of course, it must be recognized that the use of contingent
payment methods do not come out without cost: The seller ends up
bearing more of the risk concerning what true value really is, and some
contingent payment methods are prone to moral hazard problems (e.g.,
earnings-based methods are subject to acquiring companies' accounting
manipulation of earnings).
Proposition 5 can be viewed as an implication of Proposition 4;
sellers will be more likely to sell their items if they expect to receive a
higher price for them, as is the case with contingent payments. There is
another effect behind Proposition 5, however, besides just a priceincreasing effect. Contingent payment methods can often help to resolve
differences in belief between the buyer and the seller. For example, an
acquiring company might believe that a selling company's prospects are
less rosy than does the selling company itself. With such a difference in
opinion over the status of the company's prospects, there may be no cash
price at which a mutually agreeable exchange can be effected. Yet trade
might be effected through a non-cash payment method: A contingent
payment method will give the seller more value if he is right about the
company's prospects while at the same time will make the buyer give up
less value if he is right about the company's prospects. In more popular
terms, using a contingent payment method such as giving the selling
139.
See, e.g., Braunschweigerv. American Home Shield Corp., No. 10755, 1989
WL 128571, at "4 (merger consideration included contingent payment right securities
where the value of the security depended on the company's future earnings).
140.
See supra Proposition 1.
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company shares in the new company allows the selling shareholders to
participate in future earnings of the selling company, and this might
induce those shareholders to part with the company, even if they are very
optimistic about its future. According to Proposition 5, then, non-cash
bids are an efficiency-enhancing device; they help to promote mutually
beneficial exchange.
Post-Schneider we should expect to see sellers and auctioneers
preferring all-cash bids so as to reduce potential litigation risks. In any
structured auction-for instance, the sale of a private company-it would
be possible for the selling company to state that only cash bids will be
considered. 4 ' From Propositions 4 and 5, this restriction will reduce
the seller's expected price and reduce the efficiency of the corporate
auction market, yet the move will be in sellers' interests given the change
in liability regimes.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The argument against Schneider's increased liability for auctioneers
is really threefold: First, the decision establishes poor legal precedent;
second, current incentives are already sufficient to promote quality
auctioneering services; and third, Schneider is unlikely to change the
quality of auctioneer services and will increase other auction costs.
While we can understand a concern for management, directors, and
advisors colluding (either explicitly or implicitly) against shareholders,
this concern, in part, is already addressed through the Delaware "aiding
and abetting" standard, does not justify creating such an expensive safety
net for shareholders.
Opening the door for direct suits against corporate advisors for
simple negligence will create tremendous increased costs, and only
minimal benefits, to shareholders. If some form of direct action by
shareholders against investment bankers is needed to stop financial
advisers from favoring management-backed bidders, then we would favor
eliminating indemnification and insurance agreements in exchange for
capping investment banker liability at the amount of their (quite considerable) fees.142 We agree with an earlier study of director liability that
for liability to work efficiently, there must be "a scaling down of the
In public company auctions, the directors could, under Delaware law, refuse
141.
to accept a nominally higher bid including securities. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Coffee makes a somewhat similar recommendation for contractual provisions
142.
between the company and its investment bankers. He suggests that the two parties agree
to "eliminate consequential damages and restrict the [banker's] liability to return of the
compensation it received from the corporation." Coffee, supra note 62, at 6.
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simultaneously with elimination of indemnification

and insurance." 43 Otherwise, as it stands today, Schneider reduces the
revenues generated in corporation auctions to the detriment of the selling
companies shareholders without creating significant benefits.

143.

Conard, supra note 84, at 919.

